Report of the Joint Jubilee Campaign-CSW Delegation To North Korea (DPRK), September 13th to the 18th 2003.

The Delegation comprised Baroness Cox of Queensbury, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and Mr. James Mawdsley.

1.0 Background:

1.1 During the autumn of 2002 Lord (David) Alton (DA) met with a North Korean Christian who visited the House of Lords. The refugee was accompanied by a member of Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF) and CSW’s Lizzie Batha. Following the arrest of some of their personnel MSF had recently ended their work in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The refugee was in London as the guest of CSW and recounted how his wife and child had been killed in the DPRK. He had fled across the border with another child, who had tragically died on the journey. He graphically described the fate of those refugees who were forcibly repatriated by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the DPRK. Cruel punishments were reserved for those with a political or religious belief at variance with the ideology of the DPRK's rulers.  

1.2 DA promised that he would seek to raise the DPRK's record on human rights in the British Parliament and tabled a motion for debate.  Some of the material was subsequently used in The Suffering Church series recorded for the American Catholic TV network, EWTN, and which included a programme on the DPRK.

1.3 Subsequently DA received reports, via Wilfred Wong of the British Jubilee Campaign, and Jubilee America, about cases they were tracking. During his January 2003 visit to Laos, Vietnam and the Burma Border with Ann Buwalda of Jubilee America and Congressman Joseph Pitts (Rep.Pensylvannia) the possibility of taking further action on North Korea was frequently discussed. Back in the UK DA spoke with Baroness (Caroline) Cox (CC) - who had been actively pursuing the North Korean question in Geneva - and time was finally secured for DA’s debate in the House of Lords (the only one to have taken place in either House). Both Jubilee Campaign and CSW provided copious briefing material on human rights violations

to Members of the House.

1.4 When the debate occurred in March 2003 (see Appendix A, Hansard, for the written record) it was over-shadowed by the DPRK's decision to recommence its nuclear weapons programme and to refuse access to its facilities by inspectors. In one respect this was providential because it ensured the presence of some senior political figures for the debate   This consisted of a series of speeches that mixed the security and human rights questions. 

1.5 James Mawdsley (JM) and CSW's Lizzie Batha had discussed the possibility of a parliamentary delegation visiting the DPRK and when JM put this proposal to DA he expressed enthusiasm (and suggested that we might invite a Congressman or Senator to join us). JM subsequently approached the recently opened DPRK Embassy on behalf of DA and CC.  The embassy's political officer, Mr.Ha Sin Guk, came to see the prospective delegation at Westminster. He undertook to put our request to Pyongyang. Within 48 hours he told us that such a visit would be welcomed. The DPRK said that they would wish the group to be entirely British rather than British-American, whilst not ruling out such a possibility for the future.

1.6 Our request was timely as the UK had been the first country to avail itself of the EU decision to lift restrictions on diplomatic relations and to open an embassy in Pyongyang.

1.7 We emphasized that among the issues we would wish to discuss in the DPRK would be human rights and that we would want to visit churches. The Foreign Office were closely informed of these discussions and offered no objection to such an initiative.

1.8 Following a further meeting at the House of Lords DA, CC and JM visited the DPRK Embassy on 9th Sep, their National Day. Among the others present was Mr.Jon Benjamin, Head of the Human Rights Policy Department and Mr.Christopher W.Osborne, Deputy Head of Protocol Division and Assistant Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1.9 The delegation arrived in the DPRK on September 13th 2003 for a six-day visit.  It was the first delegation from the House of Lords to ever visit the DPRK, and the first UK parliamentary visit in more than a decade. It is difficult to adequately emphasize the importance the North Koreans placed on having a deputy Speaker of the House of the Lords with us. This opened up the opportunity to meet senior members of their Assembly and Government.

1.10 Before departing the delegation carefully discussed our objectives and depending on how the visit progressed (and whether it was or was not used for propaganda purposes) we would determine our response. Although our primary reason for travelling to the DPRK was not to engage in the issues surrounding the nuclear stand-off it inevitably dominated the talks with our hosts.

1.11 We were struck by the parallels with the latter days of the Cold War. Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. and Britain used Cruise Missiles and military power to creatively force hard-headed negotiations with the Soviet Union (USSR). At the time, Margaret Thatcher famously said of Mikhail Gorbachev, a former head of the KGB, this is "a man with whom we can do business."  Ronald Reagan correctly countered the threat of force with force while simultaneously encouraging glasnost, perestroika, the Helsinki Process and constructive engagement. 

1.12 Although there are parallels to be drawn there are also some important differences. The regime in Pyongyang presides over a small country with a siege mentality (more like Albania than the USSR). Systematic isolation has made it fearful and defensive. China's subtle support for the US (in the recent six-nations talks held to resolve the nuclear stand-off) has left it feeling even more cornered.

1.13 The prevailing ideology is premised on the personality cult of worship of their dead leader (Kim Il Sung) and the dynastic succession of his son, Kim Jong Il, mixed with Marxist-Leninism, neo-Confucianism, Communism, and Patriotism. There is a strong component anti-Americanism and the legacy of suffering inflicted during the Japanese occupation.

      

1.14 As we left the DPRK, Patriot Missiles were being deployed along the border with South Korea by the US.  Tensions continue to be high at the time of writing.

1.15 Not to have engaged in this momentous question, and its resolution, would have undermined the seriousness and credibility of our delegation. If we had appeared narrow or myopic in our concerns it would have also undermined our long-term hopes for fundamental change on religious liberties and human rights concerns.

1.16 It was our unanimous view that out of this serious crisis can come the possibility for further and deeper engagement on the whole raft of human rights, religious liberties, economic and humanitarian issues.

2.0 Narrative of the Visit:

2.1 Saturday September 13th

2.1.1 We stayed at Pyongyang's Koryo Hotel.  Thanks to Jubilee-CSW we were able to cover our own travel and accommodation costs, thus ensuring our independence. Our hosts provided transport. We were met at the airport and greeted at the hotel by Kang Nung Su, the Vice Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and by Her Majesty’s Ambassador, Mr. David Slinn (formerly Ambassador to Mongolia).  Mr.Kang was joined by several other senior figures of the SPA and they hosted a dinner for us. Through our Ambassador we reciprocated this hospitality with a dinner at the Embassy on the last night of the visit.

2.2 Sunday, September 14th

2.2.1 We began the day with a visit to Kumsusan Memorial Palace - to visit the tomb of Kim Il Sung. Like Lenin and Ho Chi Minh before him, Kim Il Sung has been encased in a glass coffin. The memorial is on an epic scale.

2.2.2 Later in the morning they acceded to our request to visit the Bongsu Protestant church and Pyongyang's Catholic church. A full report of what we found is contained in the statement we issued to the religious press (attached as Appendix B). CC's judgment was that it was highly significant that so many pastors from the South could travel to the North and organise the building of a seminary. They had two new hymn books – a newly reprinted North Korean hymn book alongside the previously available South Korean hymn book - and bibles available to them. CC had spoken at the Seoul church of Pastor Kim Soon Kwon, who preached at the service.

2.2.3 The Catholics are in a less happy situation - with no priests in North Korea. Services are led by three lay men and so the service is non-eucharistic and the possibility of Holy Communion denied to believers. DA’s conversation with the Church President was in the presence of officials (Mr.Han Il Son, Secretary General of the Korea Council of Religionists, Director of External Affairs, Korean Catholics Association), and, therefore, circumspect. DA did give bibles provided by the Bible Society and resources from the Catholic Truth Society. Whether they were subsequently allowed to keep these DA cannot judge. There are no formal relations with the Holy See and the presence of a Legate or Nuncio would be a significant move forward. Since the seventeenth century and when a young Korean brought the faith back with him from Beijing, where he had been baptized there have been over 8,000 martyrs (see Appendix C). DA presented a booklet with the picture of St.Andrew Kim on the cover. The first Korean Catholic priest, he was martyred at the age of 25.  The President of the Church was visibly moved by the picture and clearly surprised that the delegation knew St.Andrew Kim’s story and that the story of their martyrs was known in the West.

2.2.4 Later in the day the delegation went to Mangyongdae Native Home - the village home of Kim Il Sung. Great emphasis is placed on his humble origins, the strength of his family's commitment to the struggle against Japan, his closeness to the people.

2.2.5 Subsequently we traveled to Anju, about 80 kilometers north of Pyongyang, in South Pyongan Province. Here we met the redoubtable Mrs.Kim Chui Ok - for the past 15 years the Chairman of the Municipal People's Commitee. Anju is an industrial city of around 200,000 people - many of whom work in the chemical industry. We were taken to see the work of an Irish aid agency, Concern, who have been one of the few Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to remain in the DPRK. They are hugely respected for their water purification and irrigation projects. Thanks to their work the aptly-named "paddy" fields have seen an increase of 30 tonnes per annum in their yields.

2.2.6 Among the issues we discussed with Mrs.Kim, whose district is divided into 32 dong (urban areas) and ri (rural areas), were education, agriculture, health care, and penal policies. She confirmed to us that adults involved in crime are referred to the Ministry of Public Security  and may be punished by labour or at a correctional centre. When used as labour they may be deployed on infrastructure work "dykes, irrigation projects or used wherever there is a shortage of labour." She told us that the central authorities reserve decisions on when to use re-education, corporal punishment or capital punishment.

2.2.7 Mrs.Kim, who is also Chairman of Anju's Justice Committee said that in an average year, city-wide, there might be "one or two cases of capital punishment." Last year, she said,  there had been "about sixty cases of corporal punishment and quite a lot sent for re-education." She said that these punishments were given for offences "such as theft or things like failing to maintain safety in the factory."    

2.2.8 Mrs.Kim told us that there are no churches in Anju. There had been a Catholic church, bombed during the Korean War 50 previously. She volunteered the information that believers still, to this day, travel to the ruined church to hold their own services. When we offered to rebuild the church she said "we are not interested in churches". CC countered with the words "but we are."

2.2.9 Mrs.Kim is desperate for a project to pipe water into about twelve high rise blocks that we saw in Anju. We have asked for an estimate of the cost and will take the development proposal to The Department for International Development (DFID) or for European funding (perhaps linked to a friendship project to rebuild the church). The pipe project would cost an estimated half a million Euros.

2.2.10 Mrs.Kim admitted the province suffered from shortages of medical supplies.

2.3 Monday, September 15th

2.3.1 We visited Kim Il Sung University; met the Korean Social Democratic Party at their headquarters and held talks with Mr.Chae Su Hun, the deputy Foreign Minister.    The University's President told us that despite all the other challenges that existed in 1945, after Korea was liberated from the Japanese occupation, a top priority of Kim Il Sung was to build a university. They now have  three colleges, 13 faculties (engaged in the natural and social sciences) and nine research institutes.   Kim Il Sung university has 1,200 undergraduate students, 2,000 postgraduates, and 2,500 teaching staff/researchers. We were shown around a small exhibition of zoological specimens. The taxidermists had impressively preserved some specimens of large tigers, turtles and bears - all of whom, we were told in an obligatory after thought - had been endangered by US bombing.

2.3.2 The British Council has provided some help with English teaching but when we met some students and members of the English Department they especially pleaded for more English books and resources.

2.3.3 When we asked what they currently read we were told "Shakespeare, Dickens, Agatha Christie and Jeffrey Archer."  Helpfully, the British Ambassador was able to give an immediate commitment to a gift of £10,000 for further books. We also heard repeated requests for students to be allowed to come to England to undertake language and business studies.  We added that two-way exchanges would be ideal.

2.3.4 The University Vice-Chancellor, Mr.Paek Chol, explained that Australia had engaged in academic exchanges, in areas covering genetics and cloning of animals (e.g. rabbits).

2.3.5 Next was a meeting with the Korean Social Democratic Party (KSDP).  They told us that they have 52 deputies in the Assembly (whose chamber we later visited), comprising some 7.6% of the Presidium. They also have 890 deputies in local assemblies. They are one of three political parties (along with the small Chondoist Chongu religious party and the Workers Party). We were told that the Chondoist Chongu Party represents "indigenous religion of eastern enlightenment." They "regard man as god”. The party's Founder, Choe Seu, said in 1870 that he had founded his movement to oppose "western" Christianity. At each of our meetings we presented copies of the Holy Bible, in the Korean tongue. We gave this special gift from British parliamentarians because there is a reading from Scripture before all our parliamentary proceedings, but, on this occasion, we also remarked  that Christianity was a religion with its origins in the Middle East, not the West.

2.3.6 The KSDP in not an opposition party in any sense that the west would understand. "We believe in multi-party socialism" they told us. The common goal of the nation, it was repeatedly stated is "single-hearted unity." Although Article 67 of the DPRK Constitution allows for the formation of a new political party there would have to be considerable change before any dissenting party is permitted: "There is no room for strife or struggle."

2.3.7 The KSDP said that they and the Workers Party of Kim Jong Il "have no difference in concern for the nation". They said that their differences were philosophical: "The Workers Party believes in Juche - that man Is master of his own destiny; man Is master of everything; man becomes god - in our case it is a belief in independence, the independence of society."

2.3.8 While the KWP supposedly leans toward representing workers, farmers, soldiers and "working intellectuals", the KSPD claims to have closer ties with the middle classes and their children.

2.3.9 At our meeting with Chae Su Hun, the Deputy Foreign Minister, he said he believed our delegation's presence (which was reported upon daily in the newspapers and on DPRK television) was "a really excellent initiative - broadening relations in the field."

2.3.10 Mr.Chae related some of Korea's history.  He explained that in 1905, the US signed a treaty with the Japanese, whereby the US agreed not to obstruct Japan's growing domination of Korea in return for Japan not obstructing the US's growing dominance in the Philippines.  He did not mention that the UK signed a treaty with Japan In the same year with a similar agreement protecting the UK's influence in China.

2.3.11 We had a detailed discussion about foreign affairs and defence. Mr.Chae candidly admitted that the collapse of the markets in the former socialist countries has, along with US sanctions, been economically ruinous. Combined with several natural disasters which had occurred since 1994, this had badly damaged capacity and output. He claimed, however, that "the people are in high spirits and are well educated."

2.3.12 On the nuclear stand-off he said DPRK's "final purpose" was the denuclearisation of the peninsular. He (and every other senior figure we encountered) stated categorically that they believed that the nuclear confrontation could be "resolved by peaceful means." Mr.Chae said that both sides could take simultaneous action and he said that mood change would be facilitated if the US could abandon " their position of hostility towards the DPRK." If this occurred "we would then give up the nuclear programme and then dismantle…." This would "lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations."

2.3.13 Mr.Chae insisted that for the DPRK "to lay down arms in advance of such an engagement would be death"; that "our nuclear programme is for the purposes of deterrence not for offensive purposes"; that "our final purpose is to make the peninsular nuclear free"; and he summed up the two key issues that could lead to resolution of the confrontation as:

•  A US commitment not to launch a pre-emptive attack, "not to fight one-another"; and

•  a long-term commitment to peaceful co-existence on the peninsular.

2.3.14 "Our demand is very humble" he said.  Mr.Chae made it clear that he would prefer bilateral talks with the US and that the DPRK was deeply unhappy with the six nation multilateral talks. We reiterated that the UK and the EU both believed that the multilateral approach would be the most productive route. Mr.Chae did not repeat his government's reported statement that they would not participate in another six nation round of negotiations.

2.3.15 We proceeded to raise the issue of human rights with Mr.Chae and handed him the details of two South Korean pastors who were abducted in 1995 and 2000 (see Appendix D). We said that we did not expect an immediate response and that if one were not forthcoming by the time of our departure we would seek a response from the DPRK Ambassador in London. Mr.Chae responded by stating:  "We also believe that the human rights issue is very important. We are not hesitant to hold a dialogue - although the question is whether it creates dialogue or confrontation. How to define human rights is the issue; the most important issue is the sovereignty of a State.   The worst violation is to invade another country.  The second right is the right to existence, the right to life." He went on to say that in the DPRK there was "no homelessness, no mafia, no drugs, no illiteracy, no unemployment, no alcohol problems" and then to ask whether "30 million unemployed and 3 million imprisoned in the US constitutes human rights; or 25,000 homeless in Japan. What would be their response if you asked them about human rights?" He went on to say that they had tasted the bitter experience of permitting two French Senators to visit a DPRK prison, allowing them to take notes and photographs, only to have their return to France immediately followed by damning press coverage of the DPRK prisons. He said he had been genuinely shocked that the EU had adopted a hostile resolution against the DPRK last March. When we pressed him further with our own request to send a UK team into the prisons he said "if there is more co-operation you could visit…But if our MFA asks the government to allow you to visit the prisons now, they will not accept.  Mr.Chae suggested that when DPRK-EU relations were more favourable, such visits would be possible.

The issue of abductions was raised.

The meeting, scheduled for under an hour, ran onto one hour 45 minutes.

2.3.16 We then met with Ri Ryong Nam, the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. He was candid about the difficulties facing the country's economy but expressed some optimism: "where there are no smiles there is no progress." He explained the foci for economic reform in the DPRK.  He said the most acute shortage was power, and so there was an urgent need to build large-scale hydro-electric power stations and to rebuild coal-fired thermal power stations, as well as small scale hydro stations on rivers and streams.  Solar and biogas generators were mentioned at another meeting.

2.3.17 Secondly rail transport needed to be revitalised by producing freight and passenger carriages and by upgrading track.

2.3.18 He said steel production needed to be normalised to meet rising demand.

2.3.19 In agriculture, he said the DPRK was working hard to re-zone the fields, expand double-cropping, "a seed revolution" and the cultivation of potatoes.

2.3.20 Light industry would be encouraged, aiming to mass produce consumer goods, including food stuffs.

2.3.21 He said that they had introduced an Investment Protection Agreement and a Dual Taxation Agreement to protect investors but "I am well aware of the close linkage of political and economic issues" and conceded that without the resolution of the political problems the climate would not become conducive to business. "We will keep open our doors to businessmen and economists from the UK and will co-operate with investors. We will give greater encouragement to deepening our understanding of their needs and will formulate a small-steps strategy."

2.3.22 When asked about adapting to an age of Information Technology he said "we will actively encourage a broadband system; we will link our domestic intranet to the internet and we will allow the use of mobile telephones in order to create a better environment for businesses to flourish." The freeing of business in this way would also begin to open the country to human commerce and exposure to the concepts of free speech and individual liberty.  There is a strong and growing interest in adopting high technology applications all round.

2.3.23 As for travel and tourism, the Minister appreciated that they would have to create more infrastructure, improve the service industries, and normalise the political climate. All this said, the exterior of the Trade Ministry is still bedecked with tired giant-sized portraits of Lenin and Marx and a regulation hammer and sickle (and with the KWP addition of a brush-pen).

2.3.24 Our last meeting of the day was held with the Korean Worker's Party. Their Vice Director of the Central Committee, Ji Jae Ryong, is also a member of the National Assembly. He had been in the UK in 2001 and held meetings with several UK MPs.  For our partisan benefit, he stressed the Conservative meetings he had had, namely with Cheryl Gillan MP (Member of Parliament for Chesham and Amersham) and the former Prime Minister, Sir Edward Heath.

2.3.25 Mr.Ji said that the recent "popular celebrations" marking the 55th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK illustrated "the single hearted unity of Kim Jong Il with his people: a unity that will never be breakable." He told us that the US had predicted that the DPRK "would be wiped off the map" but "we are even stronger and taller." This had all been achieved by creating the songun ("military first") policy. He added that "the future of socialism and the fatherland rests upon the barrel of a gun." He quoted a Korean proverb that "a small pepper, although very small, can be very bitter." When we challenged the use of gun barrel diplomacy and language he stated that "other approaches are useless: only the gun barrel can guarantee the sovereignty of a country."

2.3.26 Mr.Ji summed up his Party's platform as "independence, peace and friendship." Having dispensed with the language of "military first" he switched to the milder metaphor of "building a rainbow bridge" over which they would create deeper relationships. His party, he said, has fraternal relations with 400 political parties worldwide.  Of his leader, Kim Jong Il and "the great leader" (King Il Sung) he said "we respect and worship them."

2.4 Tuesday, September 16th

2.4.1 During the morning we traveled to the border, the inaccurately named de-militarised zone (DMZ), to Panmunjom.  About 70 km north of Seoul and 168 km south of Pyongyang, Panmunjom is the "peace village" where at 10.00am on July 27th 1953 the Armistice ending the Korean War was signed. The war had begun on June 25th 1950 and the DPRK officials told us that they estimate that around 2 million people lost their lives in the hostilities that ensued. The DMZ is a no-man's land running 2km either side of the central dividing line between the north and south.   It bristles with military outposts, observation towers, and at Panmunjom, separated by a few yards, troops from the two Koreas stand in silent confrontation. Between 1976 and 1979 permanent barriers bisecting the peninsular were put in place. The entire width of the DMZ was land mined in the early days and the DPRK military confirmed to us that no record existed of their location (thus hampering clearance should the zone ever be dispensed with).

2.4.2 We visited the building where the armistice was agreed and were genuinely struck by the pain felt by our hosts over the division of Korea. On the monument erected to Kim Il Sung at Panmunjom on the first anniversary of his death appear the words: "the biggest gift I could give the Korean nation is the gift of re-unification."  Although careful to emphasise their willingness to co-exist with the south as "two systems in one nation" the prize of re-unification would undoubtedly spur the north to make considerable concessions and changes.

2.4.3 The DMZ reminded us of the theatre of the absurd. South Korean soldiers made a point of filming our presence on the other side of the line, as presumably they do with all visitors, while tourists arrived on both sides to gawp at one another. We were struck by how apposite are J.F.Kennedy's words to the divided city of Berlin. If the entire world needed to become Berliners perhaps we all need to become Koreans and understand the pain represented at Panmunjom. We left the thought in the visitors’ book that "men should build bridges, not walls."

2.4.4 On our return to Pyongyang we made a courtesy call on the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, Choe Tae Boc. He expressed concern at "the extremely tense situation on the peninsular." He also told us about the August 3rd elections and the "changes" that had occurred in their wake. Mr.Choe told us that Kim Jong Il had been "invariably and unanimously re-elected" - "a signal event in the life of the Korean people." In what was a re-curing theme at many of our encounters he reminded us of the 36 years of Japanese subjugation: "many of our parents and grandparents lost their lives in the struggle." In 1945, he said, Kim Il Sung had to lead "a backward and semi-feudal country."

2.4.5 The duty of the leadership, Mr.Choe said, was to "serve the people" (a recurring theme on posters in public buildings and in the countryside). During another discourse on the philosophy of Juche he insisted that "man is master of everything; man decides everything; the popular masses become the main driving force."

2.4.6 He also said, "speaking frankly there is not much coverage of the DPRK in the western media.  But what there is, is very bad coverage."  He went on to issue an invitation for the Speakers of the House of Lords and Commons to visit the DPRK.

2.4.7 Following this meeting we visited Pyongyang's metro system. Dug at 100m, an exceptionally deep level our hosts confirmed that the stations and tunnels could be used as shelters in the event of an attack. The metro itself is efficient and clean and decorated with murals

2.5 Wednesday September 17th

2.5.1 During a visit to the show-case Pyongyang maternity hospital we met staff and patients. During a later meeting in Beijing with Douglas Broderick of the United Nations World Food Programme we were told that the average hospital in DPRK "has fewer medicines than you would have in you medicine chest at home." The Pyongyang Maternity Hospital, by contrast, is well-endowed and was built and equipped on the order of Kim Il Sung (built between April 1979 and July 1980). There are 1500 beds (500 cots, 350 for mothers and 600 for gynecology and obstetrics. An average of 40 babies is delivered daily. While we were there we saw some triplets. Their mother had already given birth to a previous set of triplets and, before that, to three other children. Since opening there have been 328 triplets and 4 quadruplets delivered with a premature baby of as little as 800 grams surviving. We saw two new arrivals and their young mothers - the babies had been named Happiness and Still Strong Tiger.  Fathers are not allowed to be present at their child's birth within the maternity hospital for "reasons of hygiene".  The hospital was described to us as "a woman's palace" and its director enthused that "heroes and scientists are unthinkable without a mother." By contrast with China no one-child policy is practiced, they say that abortion, although legal, is rare and that having more children "increase status and respect." Most of the people we spoke to had families of two or three children.  Later, at the People's Palace of Culture we met with Jong Yun Hyong, who has been Director of External Relations for the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee since 1995. He reminded us that the DPRK had experienced its worst major flood in a century in 1995. Many of the mines were flooded and remain unusable and Mr.Jong blamed the US for "their persistence in blocking development aid" to allow reclamation of the mines.

2.5.2 Although he expected a good harvest this year he told us that the average person would receive only about 350-400 grams of rice per day while the target was a daily allowance of 600 grams. There had been "some examples of malnutrition and a deterioration of health." He said the three main factors in agriculture were "seed, water and fertilizer."  He continued that lack of energy meant water could not be pumped to fields and that fertilizer could not be manufactured.  Hence lack of power was at the root of the food shortages.

2.5.3 We discussed the reasons why NGOs and the provision of humanitarian aid are hampered by problems of access, distribution and transparency. He agreed that about 20% of the country remains prohibited to foreigners: "we cannot budge here. We learnt from Iraq that you will conduct espionage." He said that the DPRK government could look after the people in the prohibited areas. As for the remaining 80% of the territory he said there are now 50 monitoring teams (some we discovered are individuals not teams) in the country. 19 of these are from the World Food Programme (WFP), 11 from the International Red Cross (IRC) and 10 NGOs. In our later discussions with World Vision (who have a virus free potato seed project operating in most of the country) and a number of other agencies we satisfied ourselves that access and transparency are much improved over the past two and a half years. UNWFP told us that "We have come to the conclusion that food deprivation is not being targeted" by the regime as a political weapon.

2.5.4 Mr.Jong stressed that while emergency aid was vital, what the DPRK really wanted was development aid.  He concluded that "Men are most grateful to those who give at the times of their greatest need."

2.5.5 Later in the day we held talks with Mr.Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, the most senior political figure we met during our visit. He ranks number two or three in the country's political hierarchy.

We were told to expect a brief meeting of ten minutes but in the event we spent one hour and 40 minutes with him.

Mr.Kim reiterated his belief that the nuclear issue could be resolved peacefully; was keen to see bi-lateral relations strengthened; did not, at this juncture, believe that there was a specific mediating role that might be performed by the United Kingdom and told us that behind the scenes US-DPRK “backstairs talks” were happening in New York.  He remarked on the importance of working for the goal of co-existence within a re-united Korea.

During this meeting CC conveyed a private letter to Mr.Kim.

2.5.6 Mr.Kim welcomed the news communicated to him by CC that it was the delegation’s intention to establish an All-Party Parliamentary British-North Korea group and believed that this would be a suitable vehicle for continuing dialogue. Mr.Kim accepted a copy of the Bible and specifically asked that “Christians in the West be asked to pray for the people of Korea.”His final message was to emhasise that the people do not hate the Americans; and that “change can take place more quickly than we might have though possible.” This was repeated by a senior official as we left the city’s railway station on the following morning.

2.5.7 CC subsequently went for a 2-hour walk around Pyongyang, without any restrictions or “minder.” Free to walk wherever she chose, she was encouraged by this freedom, very different from the situation experienced in some other Communist countries. Also encouraging was the demeanor of the people: friendly, smiling and, in several places enjoying dancing in the open air in situations which could not have been contrived as “showcase” events. There were shops, which, although not comparable to western stores in choice and abundance, had more supplies than non-party shops in the former Soviet Union. We recognise that Pyongyang is not typical of the whole of the DPRK but it compares favourably in atmosphere with capital cities such as Moscow, Warsaw or Bucharest in the days of the “Iron Curtain.” 

2.5.8 The day concluded with a dinner and discussion hosted at the British Embassy (during which the DPRK delegates responded to the points in the private communiqué delivered to Mr.Kim Yong Nam). They reminded us of the Korean proverb that “where there is blossom it is because there is no wind.”

2.5.9 By and large, the DPRK authorities accommodated the itinerary we had requested while in London, although they were not able to make significant additions at the last minute.

2.5.10 The delegation was free to use video and still cameras throughout the trip (except at Kim Il Sung's mausoleum).

2.5.11 Although the delegation received several specific requests for help, officials were reluctant to give their contact details, making it difficult to follow up the requests.

2.6 Thursday September 18th

2.6.1 The delegation left Pyongyang railway station and traveled throughout the day and overnight by train through North Korea to the Chinese capital of Beijing. The countryside was poor but cultivated. Tractors and oxen worked the fields. Hay making and harvesting were underway and people were going about everyday tasks. Although the country is totally State-controlled we were struck that it did not “feel” suffocated or oppressed by fear in the manner of the former USSR. This is not to down-play or deny the use of cruelty and inhumane treatment of prisoners and dissidents.

2.7 Friday September, 19th

2.7.1 In Beijing the delegation met the British Ambassador, Sir Christopher Hum; Khalid Malik, the UN Resident Co-coordinator in China; Colin Mitchell, the UNHCR Regional Representative for China and Mongolia; Douglas Broderick of the United Nations World Food Programme; and Macleod Nyirongo of the United Nations Development Programme.

2.7.2 We had asked the Ambassador to arrange a meeting for us with the Chinese Foreign Affairs Department. He had been unable to do this. We gave him a copy of the list of North and South Korean detainees prepared for us by Jubilee America and had a long discussion about their plight. We pointed out that UNHCR had told us that 200-300 North Koreans are still being repatriated forcibly each week without status or determination. We said that the punishments are most extreme for those who have left the country more than once; that they are always harsher if the individual is connected to a religious organization; and that they face execution if it is known that they had tried to leave China. We cited evidence that 26 refugees are currently detained at one check-point in Mongolia facing a very uncertain outcome.

2.7.3 The British ambassador said that his role is simply to raise cases involving UK nationals or where Chinese policy, involving human rights violations or religious liberties issues directly impinged on Chinese nationals. We pointed out that China was failing to honour international agreements about the treatment of refugees to which they and we are signatories.     

2.7.4 We asked for the name of the appropriate person in the Department of Foreign Affairs for us to contact. Sir Christopher referred us to Mrs.Fu Ying, Director General of their Asia Department. Before leaving Beijing we delivered a letter of protest (Appendix E) including the list of detained North and South Koreans (Appendix F).

2.7.5 During our meetings with the UN agencies we were reminded that in the 1960s the North Korean economy was twice as viable as that of the South; that “a developed country has become a non-developed country”; that since the departure of MSF, health needs had become desperate – “an unlimited need”; that following food shortages and famine “there are not many elderly people left in the DPRK”; that in the north east, on the border with China, orphaned children whose parents had died during the famine were living on the streets: “street swallows” as young as 7; that the DPRK’s failing infrastructure means that, for instance, 60-70% of electricity transmission “is lost down the grid” and that, in their view, China’s pressure on the DPRK meant that “we are no longer heading towards Armageddon” but also that “the US has no real interest in resolving this matter.”

(Our complete itinerary of our visit appears at Appendix G).

3.0 Recommendations

These fall into three categories: Security; Political; and Economic.

3.1. Security

•  It is not unimaginable that the DPRK may feel trapped by the failure to resolve the nuclear confrontation and so test a nuclear weapon. This would trigger disastrous consequences, even the possibility of a nuclear strike by the US and its allies. We recommend that the two conditions for denuclearisation, i.e. a commitment to no first strike by either side and a pledge of peaceful co-existence should be offered by the US to the DPRK. This does not require bilateral talks. It would soon become evident whether the DPRK’s promised response of denuclearisation is a mirage but nothing would have been lost by such a move.

•  We believe a peaceful outcome is indeed possible; that the DPRK is exhausted and weakened and does not seem to pose any real military threat (and is an unwelcome distraction at a time of confrontation with radical Islamic terrorist organizations).

•  The DPRK seems genuinely afraid that they will be attacked and needs to be offered some “face saving” formula to permit a lowering of the temperature.

•  Private informal “backstairs” talks between the US and the DPRK should continue and be encouraged but not replace the multilateral talks. The outcome of those talks might usefully be guaranteed by the EU or UN.

•  Until last October the US were able to enter the DPRK to search for bodies of servicemen missing in action. We would like to see such arrangements recommenced and informal reciprocal meetings of army officers from both sides.

•  The DPRK said that they were purposefully misquoted by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in October 2002 in saying that they had a nuclear device. They claim they actually said they had “a more powerful weapon than a nuclear bomb, namely single hearted unity of the nation.” Their hint is that they do not actually have such weapons but the evidence is mixed and we believe that as a condition of “peaceful co-existence" it would be imperative for the resumption of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

 3.2. Political

•  We recommend the encouragement of Helsinki-style initiatives of mutual engagement between the DPRK and the West/South Korea.

•  There is nothing to fear from a step-by-step approach towards two systems in one country and we should offer models and evidence (e.g. Hong Kong/China and models for Joint Assemblies such as the Council of Europe).

•  The German experience of re-unification should inspire confidence in such a process taking place in Korea.

•  There should be an end to isolationism and a normalization of diplomatic relations. In the worst days of the Soviet Union there was always a US Embassy in Moscow. The US experience in China and Vietnam in using trade as a stimulus for reform would also be pertinent.

•  The US and UK should encourage more parliamentarians and Members of Congress to travel to the DPRK and to engage them in dialogue.

•  President Clinton predicted the implosion of the DPRK. This was a miscalculation but a policy of asphyxiation could also be a dangerous miscalculation.

•  The DPRK needs to understand that pluralism, the creation of genuine opposition parties, free speech, open dialogue on human rights, religious and political liberties, will all have to be addressed before South Korea allows a permanent deepening of relationships

•  We recommend that pressure continue to be asserted in requesting the admission of an independent assessment team to visit the prisons. Such a team might include doctors, lawyers and engineers and might seek EU resources to allow for the rebuilding of the prisons.

•  China’s role in repatriating a significant number of DPRK refugees should be challenged by the international community. As most leave for economic reasons, aid programmes need to be re-established in the northern areas most affected by hunger. When leaving for reasons of persecution an orderly passage to South Korea should be guaranteed by the international community.

3.3 Economic

•  The economic fortunes of the DPRK are dependent on progress being made on security and political concerns.

•  Projects such as the railway linking the north and south should be expedited and passenger transportation (as well as cargo) be encouraged.

•  Investors and NGOs are wary of an uncertain future: many more would come if the key questions were resolved.

•  Internet and mobile phone networks should be opened up – allowing communications with free societies.

•  The British Council should open and office in Pyongyang; meet the huge demand for English as a Foreign Language; and provide the university with more English publications.

•     Requested exchanges of students, especially students in business studies, should be expedited.

•  We share the DPRK view that emergency aid should be complemented by development aid. We recommend that a priority should be small micro projects (such as the water irrigation and purification project established by the Irish aid agency, Concern, at Anju, that we mention at Page 9 of our report).

4.0 Conclusions

4.1 As they plunge into a deepening crisis, the DPRK realises that it is at a critical crossroads. It is our firm conclusion that they are seeking a way forward.  When they say that they are seeking a peaceable outcome they should be taken at their word and the sincerity of their claim tested through engagement.

4.2 The history of the DPRK suggests that mere threats will be counter-productive, inducing paranoia, isolationism, and the destabilization of the region. Recent US policy has convinced the regime that the status quo is not an option. The DPRK now needs a face-saving exit strategy. Progress on these issues would further enable progress on the human rights issues that motivated our visit. A divided Korea is provoking regional instability. A united Korea could be a force for stability in the region and be a strong counter weight to other regional players.

4.3 In the short-term we are deeply concerned about the plight of repatriated refugees and about the conditions in the prisons.  The international community should not await the resolution of strategic issues before pursuing these questions with the DPRK.  But we are convinced that engagement on all fronts represents the best way forward. The delegation will form an All-Party Parliamentary British-North Korean group to facilitate our own continued engagement and we hope that the Foreign Office will provide resources to enable its work to prosper.

David Alton,

Caroline Cox

September 25th, 2003.