Report of the Joint Jubilee
Campaign-CSW Delegation To North Korea (DPRK), September 13th to the 18th 2003.
Ce rapport n’est disponible qu’en anglais
The Delegation comprised Baroness Cox of Queensbury,
Lord Alton of
Liverpool, and Mr. James Mawdsley.
1.0
Background:
1.1 During the autumn of
2002 Lord
(David) Alton (DA) met with a North Korean Christian who visited the
House of Lords. The
refugee was accompanied by a member of Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF)
and CSW's
Lizzie Batha. Following the arrest of some of their personnel MSF had
recently ended their
work in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The refugee
was in London
as the guest of CSW and recounted how his wife and child had been
killed in the DPRK. He
had fled across the border with another child, who had tragically died
on the journey. He
graphically described the fate of those refugees who were forcibly
repatriated by the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to the DPRK. Cruel punishments were
reserved for those
with a political or religious belief at variance with the ideology of
the DPRK's rulers.
1.2 DA promised that he
would seek to
raise the DPRK's record on human rights in the British Parliament and
tabled a motion for
debate. Some of the material was subsequently
used in The Suffering Church series recorded for the American Catholic
TV network, EWTN,
and which included a programme on the DPRK.
1.3 Subsequently DA
received reports,
via Wilfred Wong of the British Jubilee Campaign, and Jubilee America,
about cases they
were tracking. During his January 2003 visit to Laos, Vietnam and the
Burma Border with
Ann Buwalda of Jubilee America and Congressman Joseph Pitts
(Rep.Pensylvannia) the
possibility of taking further action on North Korea was frequently
discussed. Back in the
UK DA spoke with Baroness (Caroline) Cox (CC) - who had been actively
pursuing the North
Korean question in Geneva - and time was finally secured for DA's
debate in the House
of Lords (the only one to have taken place in either House). Both
Jubilee Campaign and CSW
provided copious briefing material on human rights violations
to Members of the House.
1.4 When the debate
occurred in March
2003 (see Appendix A, Hansard, for the written record) it was
over-shadowed by the DPRK's
decision to recommence its nuclear weapons programme and to refuse
access to its
facilities by inspectors. In one respect this was providential because
it ensured the
presence of some senior political figures for the debate
This consisted of a series of speeches that mixed the
security and human
rights questions.
1.5 James Mawdsley (JM) and CSW's Lizzie Batha had
discussed the
possibility of a parliamentary delegation visiting the DPRK and when JM
put this proposal
to DA he expressed enthusiasm (and suggested that we might invite a
Congressman or Senator
to join us). JM subsequently approached the recently opened DPRK
Embassy on behalf of DA
and CC. The embassy's political officer,
Mr.Ha Sin Guk, came to see the prospective delegation at Westminster.
He undertook to put
our request to Pyongyang. Within 48 hours he told us that such a visit
would be welcomed.
The DPRK said that they would wish the group to be entirely British
rather than
British-American, whilst not ruling out such a possibility for the
future.
1.6 Our request was
timely as the UK
had been the first country to avail itself of the EU decision to lift
restrictions on
diplomatic relations and to open an embassy in Pyongyang.
1.7 We emphasized that
among the
issues we would wish to discuss in the DPRK would be human rights and
that we would want
to visit churches. The Foreign Office were closely informed of these
discussions and
offered no objection to such an initiative.
1.8 Following a further
meeting at the
House of Lords DA, CC and JM visited the DPRK Embassy on 9th Sep, their
National Day.
Among the others present was Mr.Jon Benjamin, Head of the Human Rights
Policy Department
and Mr.Christopher W.Osborne, Deputy Head of Protocol Division and
Assistant Marshal of
the Diplomatic Corps, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
1.9 The delegation
arrived in the DPRK on September 13th 2003 for a six-day
visit. It was the first delegation from the House of Lords to ever
visit the DPRK, and the first UK parliamentary visit in more than a
decade.
It is difficult to adequately emphasize the importance the North
Koreans placed on having a deputy Speaker of the House of the Lords
with us. This opened up the opportunity to meet senior members of their
Assembly and Government.
1.10 Before departing the
delegation
carefully discussed our objectives and depending on how the visit
progressed (and whether
it was or was not used for propaganda purposes) we would determine our
response. Although
our primary reason for travelling to the DPRK was not to engage in the
issues surrounding
the nuclear stand-off it inevitably dominated the talks with our hosts.
1.11 We were struck by
the parallels
with the latter days of the Cold War. Throughout the 1980s, the U.S.
and Britain used
Cruise Missiles and military power to creatively force hard-headed
negotiations with the
Soviet Union (USSR). At the time, Margaret Thatcher famously said of
Mikhail Gorbachev, a
former head of the KGB, this is "a man with whom we can do business."
Ronald Reagan correctly countered the threat of force with force while
simultaneously encouraging glasnost perestroika, the Helsinki
Process and
constructive engagement.
1.12 Although there are
parallels to be drawn there are also some important differences. The
regime in Pyongyang presides over a small country with a siege
mentality (more like Albania than the USSR). Systematic isolation has
made it fearful and defensive. China's subtle support for the US (in
the
recent six-nations talks held to resolve the nuclear stand-off) has
left it feeling even
more cornered.
1.13 The prevailing
ideology is
premised on the personality cult of worship of their dead leader (Kim
Il Sung) and the
dynastic succession of his son, Kim Jong Il, mixed with
Marxist-Leninism,
neo-Confucianism, Communism, and Patriotism. There is a strong
component anti-Americanism
and the legacy of suffering inflicted during the Japanese occupation.
1.14 As we left the DPRK,
Patriot
Missiles were being deployed along the border with South Korea by the
US. Tensions continue to be high at the time of
writing.
1.15 Not to have engaged
in this
momentous question, and its resolution, would have undermined the
seriousness and
credibility of our delegation. If we had appeared narrow or myopic in
our concerns it
would have also undermined our long-term hopes for fundamental change
on religious
liberties and human rights concerns.
1.16 It was our unanimous
view that
out of this serious crisis can come the possibility for further and
deeper engagement on
the whole raft of human rights, religious liberties, economic and
humanitarian issues.
2.0
Narrative of the Visit:
2.1 Saturday September 13th
2.1.1 We stayed at
Pyongyang's Koryo
Hotel. Thanks to Jubilee-CSW we were able to
cover our own travel and accommodation costs, thus ensuring our
independence. Our hosts
provided transport. We were met at the airport and greeted at the hotel
by Kang Nung Su,
the Vice Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and by Her
Majesty's
Ambassador, Mr. David Slinn (formerly Ambassador to Mongolia). Mr.Kang
was joined by several other senior figures
of the SPA and they hosted a dinner for us. Through our Ambassador we
reciprocated this
hospitality with a dinner at the Embassy on the last night of the visit.
2.2 Sunday, September 14th
2.2.1 We began the day
with a visit to
Kumsusan Memorial Palace - to visit the tomb of Kim Il Sung. Like Lenin
and Ho Chi Minh
before him, Kim Il Sung has been encased in a glass coffin. The
memorial is on an epic
scale.
2.2.2 Later in the
morning they
acceded to our request to visit the Bongsu Protestant church and
Pyongyang's Catholic
church. A full report of what we found is contained in the statement we
issued to the
religious press (attached as Appendix B). CC's judgment was that it was
highly significant
that so many pastors from the South could travel to the North and
organise the building of
a seminary. They had two new hymn books - a newly reprinted North
Korean hymn book
alongside the previously available South Korean hymn book - and bibles
available to them.
CC had spoken at the Seoul church of Pastor Kim Soon Kwon, who preached
at the service.
2.2.3 The Catholics are
in a less
happy situation - with no priests in North Korea. Services are led by
three lay men and so
the service is non-eucharistic and the possibility of Holy Communion
denied to believers.
DA's conversation with the Church President was in the presence of
officials (Mr.Han
Il Son, Secretary General of the Korea Council of Religionists,
Director of External
Affairs, Korean Catholics Association), and, therefore, circumspect. DA
did give bibles
provided by the Bible Society and resources from the Catholic Truth
Society. Whether they
were subsequently allowed to keep these DA cannot judge. There are no
formal relations
with the Holy See and the presence of a Legate or Nuncio would be a
significant move
forward. Since the seventeenth century and when a young Korean brought
the faith back with
him from Beijing, where he had been baptized there have been over 8,000
martyrs (see
Appendix C). DA presented a booklet with the picture of St.Andrew Kim
on the cover. The
first Korean Catholic priest, he was martyred at the age of 25. The
President of the Church was visibly moved by
the picture and clearly surprised that the delegation knew St.Andrew
Kim's story and
that the story of their martyrs was known in the West.
2.2.4 Later in the day
the delegation
went to Mangyongdae Native Home - the village home of Kim Il Sung.
Great emphasis is
placed on his humble origins, the strength of his family's commitment
to the struggle
against Japan, his closeness to the people.
2.2.5 Subsequently we
traveled to
Anju, about 80 kilometers north of Pyongyang, in South Pyongan
Province. Here we met the
redoubtable Mrs.Kim Chui Ok - for the past 15 years the Chairman of the
Municipal People's
Commitee. Anju is an industrial city of around 200,000 people - many of
whom work in the
chemical industry. We were taken to see the work of an Irish aid
agency, Concern, who have
been one of the few Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to remain in
the DPRK. They are
hugely respected for their water purification and irrigation projects.
Thanks to their
work the aptly-named "paddy" fields have seen an increase of 30 tonnes
per annum
in their yields.
2.2.6 Among the issues we
discussed
with Mrs.Kim, whose district is divided into 32 dong (urban areas) and
ri (rural areas),
were education, agriculture, health care, and penal policies. She
confirmed to us that
adults involved in crime are referred to the Ministry of Public
Security and may be punished by labour or at a correctional
centre. When used as labour they may be deployed on infrastructure work
"dykes,
irrigation projects or used wherever there is a shortage of labour."
She told us that
the central authorities reserve decisions on when to use re-education,
corporal punishment
or capital punishment.
2.2.7 Mrs.Kim, who is
also Chairman of
Anju's Justice Committee said that in an average year, city-wide, there
might be "one
or two cases of capital punishment." Last year, she said, there had
been "about sixty cases of corporal
punishment and quite a lot sent for re-education." She said that these
punishments
were given for offences "such as theft or things like failing to
maintain safety in
the factory."
2.2.8 Mrs.Kim told us
that there are
no churches in Anju. There had been a Catholic church, bombed during
the Korean War 50
previously. She volunteered the information that believers still, to
this day, travel to
the ruined church to hold their own services. When we offered to
rebuild the church she
said "we are not interested in churches". CC countered with the words
"but
we are."
2.2.9 Mrs.Kim is
desperate for a
project to pipe water into about twelve high rise blocks that we saw in
Anju. We have
asked for an estimate of the cost and will take the development
proposal to The Department
for International Development (DFID) or for European funding (perhaps
linked to a
friendship project to rebuild the church). The pipe project would cost
an estimated half a
million Euros.
2.2.10 Mrs.Kim admitted
the province
suffered from shortages of medical supplies.
2.3 Monday, September 15th
2.3.1 We visited Kim Il
Sung
University; met the Korean Social Democratic Party at their
headquarters and held talks
with Mr.Chae Su Hun, the deputy Foreign Minister. The University's
President told us that despite all the other
challenges that existed in 1945, after Korea was liberated from the
Japanese occupation, a
top priority of Kim Il Sung was to build a university. They now have
three colleges, 13 faculties (engaged in the
natural and social sciences) and nine research institutes. Kim Il Sung
university has 1,200 undergraduate students, 2,000
postgraduates, and 2,500 teaching staff/researchers. We were shown
around a small
exhibition of zoological specimens. The taxidermists had impressively
preserved some
specimens of large tigers, turtles and bears - all of whom, we were
told in an obligatory
after thought - had been endangered by US bombing.
2.3.2 The British Council
has provided
some help with English teaching but when we met some students and
members of the English
Department they especially pleaded for more English books and resources.
2.3.3 When we asked what
they
currently read we were told "Shakespeare, Dickens, Agatha Christie and
Jeffrey
Archer." Helpfully, the British
Ambassador was able to give an immediate commitment to a gift of
£10,000 for further
books. We also heard repeated requests for students to be allowed to
come to England to
undertake language and business studies. We
added that two-way exchanges would be ideal.
2.3.4 The University
Vice-Chancellor,
Mr.Paek Chol, explained that Australia had engaged in academic
exchanges, in areas
covering genetics and cloning of animals (e.g. rabbits).
2.3.5 Next was a meeting
with the
Korean Social Democratic Party (KSDP). They
told us that they have 52 deputies in the Assembly (whose chamber we
later visited),
comprising some 7.6% of the Presidium. They also have 890 deputies in
local assemblies.
They are one of three political parties (along with the small Chondoist
Chongu religious
party and the Workers Party). We were told that the Chondoist Chongu
Party represents
"indigenous religion of eastern enlightenment." They "regard man as
god”. The party's Founder, Choe Seu, said in 1870 that he had founded
his movement to
oppose "western" Christianity. At each of our meetings we presented
copies of
the Holy Bible, in the Korean tongue. We gave this special gift from
British
parliamentarians because there is a reading from Scripture before all
our parliamentary
proceedings, but, on this occasion, we also remarked that Christianity
was a religion with its origins in the Middle East, not the West.
2.3.6 The KSDP in not an
opposition
party in any sense that the west would understand. "We believe in
multi-party
socialism" they told us. The common goal of the nation, it was
repeatedly stated is
"single-hearted unity." Although Article 67 of the DPRK Constitution
allows for
the formation of a new political party there would have to be
considerable change before
any dissenting party is permitted: "There is no room for strife or
struggle."
2.3.7 The KSDP said that
they and the
Workers Party of Kim Jong Il "have no difference in concern for the
nation".
They said that their differences were philosophical: "The Workers Party
believes in Juche - that man Is master of his own destiny; man
Is master of everything; man becomes god - in our case it is a belief
in independence, the
independence of society."
2.3.8 While the KWP
supposedly leans
toward representing workers, farmers, soldiers and "working
intellectuals", the
KSPD claims to have closer ties with the middle classes and their
children.
2.3.9 At our meeting with
Chae Su Hun,
the Deputy Foreign Minister, he said he believed our delegation's
presence (which was
reported upon daily in the newspapers and on DPRK television) was "a
really excellent
initiative - broadening relations in the field."
2.3.10 Mr.Chae related
some of Korea's
history. He explained that in 1905, the US
signed a treaty with the Japanese, whereby the US agreed not to
obstruct Japan's growing
domination of Korea in return for Japan not obstructing the US's
growing dominance in the
Philippines. He did not mention that the UK
signed a treaty with Japan In the same year with a similar agreement
protecting the UK's
influence in China.
2.3.11 We had a detailed
discussion
about foreign affairs and defence. Mr.Chae candidly admitted that the
collapse of the
markets in the former socialist countries has, along with US sanctions,
been economically
ruinous. Combined with several natural disasters which had occurred
since 1994, this had
badly damaged capacity and output. He claimed, however, that "the
people are in high
spirits and are well educated."
2.3.12 On the nuclear
stand-off he
said DPRK's "final purpose" was the denuclearisation of the peninsular.
He (and
every other senior figure we encountered) stated categorically that
they believed that the
nuclear confrontation could be "resolved by peaceful means." Mr.Chae
said that
both sides could take simultaneous action and he said that mood change
would be
facilitated if the US could abandon " their position of hostility
towards the
DPRK." If this occurred "we would then give up the nuclear programme
and then
dismantle...." This would "lead to the establishment of diplomatic
relations."
2.3.13 Mr.Chae insisted
that for the
DPRK "to lay down arms in advance of such an engagement would be
death"; that
"our nuclear programme is for the purposes of deterrence not for
offensive
purposes"; that "our final purpose is to make the peninsular nuclear
free";
and he summed up the two key issues that could lead to resolution of
the confrontation as:
- A US commitment not
to launch a pre-emptive attack, "not to fight one-another"; and
- a long-term
commitment to peaceful co-existence on the peninsular.
2.3.14 "Our demand is
very
humble" he said. Mr.Chae made it clear
that he would prefer bilateral talks with the US and that the DPRK was
deeply unhappy with
the six nation multilateral talks. We reiterated that the UK and the EU
both believed that
the multilateral approach would be the most productive route. Mr.Chae
did not repeat his
government's reported statement that they would not participate in
another six nation
round of negotiations.
2.3.15 We proceeded to
raise the issue
of human rights with Mr.Chae and handed him the details of two South
Korean pastors who
were abducted in 1995 and 2000 (see Appendix D). We said that we did
not expect an
immediate response and that if one were not forthcoming by the time of
our departure we
would seek a response from the DPRK Ambassador in London. Mr.Chae
responded by stating: "We also believe
that the human rights issue
is very important. We are not hesitant to hold a dialogue - although
the question is
whether it creates dialogue or confrontation. How to define human
rights is the issue; the
most important issue is the sovereignty of a State. The worst violation is to invade another country. The second right is the right to existence,
the
right to life." He went on to say that in the DPRK there was "no
homelessness,
no mafia, no drugs, no illiteracy, no unemployment, no alcohol
problems" and then to
ask whether "30 million unemployed and 3 million imprisoned in the US
constitutes
human rights; or 25,000 homeless in Japan. What would be their response
if you asked them
about human rights?" He went on to say that they had tasted the bitter
experience of
permitting two French Senators to visit a DPRK prison, allowing them to
take notes and
photographs, only to have their return to France immediately followed
by damning press
coverage of the DPRK prisons. He said he had been genuinely shocked
that the EU had
adopted a hostile resolution against the DPRK last March. When we
pressed him further with
our own request to send a UK team into the prisons he said "if there is
more
co-operation you could visit...But if our MFA asks the government to
allow you to visit
the prisons now, they will not accept. Mr.Chae
suggested that when DPRK-EU relations were more favourable, such visits
would be possible.
The issue of abductions
was raised.
The meeting, scheduled
for under an
hour, ran onto one hour 45 minutes.
2.3.16 We then met with
Ri Ryong Nam,
the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. He was candid about the
difficulties facing the
country's economy but expressed some optimism: "where there are no
smiles there is no
progress." He explained the foci for economic reform in the DPRK. He said the most acute shortage was power, and
so
there was an urgent need to build large-scale hydro-electric power
stations and to rebuild
coal-fired thermal power stations, as well as small scale hydro
stations on rivers and
streams. Solar and biogas generators were
mentioned at another meeting.
2.3.17 Secondly rail
transport needed
to be revitalised by producing freight and passenger carriages and by
upgrading track.
2.3.18 He said steel
production needed
to be normalised to meet rising demand.
2.3.19 In agriculture, he
said the
DPRK was working hard to re-zone the fields, expand double-cropping, "a
seed
revolution" and the cultivation of potatoes.
2.3.20 Light industry
would be
encouraged, aiming to mass produce consumer goods, including food
stuffs.
2.3.21 He said that they
had
introduced an Investment Protection Agreement and a Dual Taxation
Agreement to protect
investors but "I am well aware of the close linkage of political and
economic
issues" and conceded that without the resolution of the political
problems the
climate would not become conducive to business. "We will keep open our
doors to
businessmen and economists from the UK and will co-operate with
investors. We will give
greater encouragement to deepening our understanding of their needs and
will formulate a
small-steps strategy."
2.3.22 When asked about
adapting to an
age of Information Technology he said "we will actively encourage a
broadband system;
we will link our domestic intranet to the internet and we will allow
the use of mobile
telephones in order to create a better environment for businesses to
flourish." The
freeing of business in this way would also begin to open the country to
human commerce and
exposure to the concepts of free speech and individual liberty. There is a strong and growing interest in
adopting high technology applications all round.
2.3.23 As for travel and
tourism, the
Minister appreciated that they would have to create more
infrastructure, improve the
service industries, and normalise the political climate. All this said,
the exterior of
the Trade Ministry is still bedecked with tired giant-sized portraits
of Lenin and Marx
and a regulation hammer and sickle (and with the KWP addition of a
brush-pen).
2.3.24 Our last meeting
of the day was
held with the Korean Worker's Party. Their Vice Director of the Central
Committee, Ji Jae
Ryong, is also a member of the National Assembly. He had been in the UK
in 2001 and held
meetings with several UK MPs. For our
partisan benefit, he stressed the Conservative meetings he had had,
namely with Cheryl
Gillan MP (Member of Parliament for Chesham and Amersham) and the
former Prime Minister,
Sir Edward Heath.
2.3.25 Mr.Ji said that
the recent
"popular celebrations" marking the 55th
anniversary of the founding of the DPRK illustrated "the single hearted
unity of Kim
Jong Il with his people: a unity that will never be breakable." He told
us that the
US had predicted that the DPRK "would be wiped off the map" but "we are
even stronger and taller." This had all been achieved by creating the songun ("military first") policy. He
added that "the future of socialism and the fatherland rests upon the
barrel of a
gun." He quoted a Korean proverb that "a small pepper, although very
small, can
be very bitter." When we challenged the use of gun barrel diplomacy and
language he
stated that "other approaches are useless: only the gun barrel can
guarantee the
sovereignty of a country."
2.3.26 Mr.Ji summed up
his Party's
platform as "independence, peace and friendship." Having dispensed with
the
language of "military first" he switched to the milder metaphor of
"building a rainbow bridge" over which they would create deeper
relationships.
His party, he said, has fraternal relations with 400 political parties
worldwide. Of his leader, Kim Jong Il and
"the great
leader" (King Il Sung) he said "we respect and worship them."
2.4 Tuesday, September 16th
2.4.1 During the morning
we traveled
to the border, the inaccurately named de-militarised zone (DMZ), to
Panmunjom. About 70 km north of Seoul and
168 km south of
Pyongyang, Panmunjom is the "peace village" where at 10.00am on July 27th 1953 the Armistice ending the Korean War was
signed. The war had begun on June 25th 1950 and
the DPRK officials told us that they estimate that around 2 million
people lost their
lives in the hostilities that ensued. The DMZ is a no-man's land
running 2km either side
of the central dividing line between the north and south. It bristles with military outposts, observation towers,
and at Panmunjom,
separated by a few yards, troops from the two Koreas stand in silent
confrontation.
Between 1976 and 1979 permanent barriers bisecting the peninsular were
put in place. The
entire width of the DMZ was land mined in the early days and the DPRK
military confirmed
to us that no record existed of their location (thus hampering
clearance should the zone
ever be dispensed with).
2.4.2 We visited the
building where
the armistice was agreed and were genuinely struck by the pain felt by
our hosts over the
division of Korea. On the monument erected to Kim Il Sung at Panmunjom
on the first
anniversary of his death appear the words: "the biggest gift I could
give the Korean
nation is the gift of re-unification." Although
careful to emphasise their willingness to co-exist with the south as
"two systems in
one nation" the prize of re-unification would undoubtedly spur the
north to make
considerable concessions and changes.
2.4.3 The DMZ reminded us
of the
theatre of the absurd. South Korean soldiers made a point of filming
our presence on the
other side of the line, as presumably they do with all visitors, while
tourists arrived on
both sides to gawp at one another. We were struck by how apposite are
J.F.Kennedy's words
to the divided city of Berlin. If the entire world needed to become
Berliners perhaps we
all need to become Koreans and understand the pain represented at
Panmunjom. We left the
thought in the visitors' book that "men should build bridges, not
walls."
2.4.4 On our return to
Pyongyang we
made a courtesy call on the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly,
Choe Tae Boc. He
expressed concern at "the extremely tense situation on the peninsular."
He also
told us about the August 3rd elections and the
"changes" that had occurred in their wake. Mr.Choe told us that Kim
Jong Il had
been "invariably and unanimously re-elected" - "a signal event in the
life
of the Korean people." In what was a re-curing theme at many of our
encounters he
reminded us of the 36 years of Japanese subjugation: "many of our
parents and
grandparents lost their lives in the struggle." In 1945, he said, Kim
Il Sung had to
lead "a backward and semi-feudal country."
2.4.5 The duty of the
leadership,
Mr.Choe said, was to "serve the people" (a recurring theme on posters
in public
buildings and in the countryside). During another discourse on the
philosophy of Juche he insisted that "man is master of
everything; man decides everything; the popular masses become the main
driving
force."
2.4.6 He also said,
"speaking
frankly there is not much coverage of the DPRK in the western media. But what there is, is very bad coverage." He went on to issue an invitation for the
Speakers
of the House of Lords and Commons to visit the DPRK.
2.4.7 Following this
meeting we
visited Pyongyang's metro system. Dug at 100m, an exceptionally deep
level our hosts
confirmed that the stations and tunnels could be used as shelters in
the event of an
attack. The metro itself is efficient and clean and decorated with
murals
2.5 Wednesday September 17th
2.5.1 During a visit to
the show-case
Pyongyang maternity hospital we met staff and patients. During a later
meeting in Beijing
with Douglas Broderick of the United Nations World Food Programme we
were told that the
average hospital in DPRK "has fewer medicines than you would have in
you medicine
chest at home." The Pyongyang Maternity Hospital, by contrast, is
well-endowed and
was built and equipped on the order of Kim Il Sung (built between April
1979 and July
1980). There are 1500 beds (500 cots, 350 for mothers and 600 for
gynecology and
obstetrics. An average of 40 babies is delivered daily. While we were
there we saw some
triplets. Their mother had already given birth to a previous set of
triplets and, before
that, to three other children. Since opening there have been 328
triplets and 4
quadruplets delivered with a premature baby of as little as 800 grams
surviving. We saw
two new arrivals and their young mothers - the babies had been named
Happiness and Still
Strong Tiger. Fathers are not allowed to
be
present at their child's birth within the maternity hospital for
"reasons of
hygiene". The hospital was described to
us as "a woman's palace" and its director enthused that "heroes and
scientists are unthinkable without a mother." By contrast with China no
one-child
policy is practiced, they say that abortion, although legal, is rare
and that having more
children "increase status and respect." Most of the people we spoke to
had
families of two or three children. Later,
at
the People's Palace of Culture we met with Jong Yun Hyong, who has been
Director of
External Relations for the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee since
1995. He reminded
us that the DPRK had experienced its worst major flood in a century in
1995. Many of the
mines were flooded and remain unusable and Mr.Jong blamed the US for
"their
persistence in blocking development aid" to allow reclamation of the
mines.
2.5.2 Although he
expected a good
harvest this year he told us that the average person would receive only
about 350-400
grams of rice per day while the target was a daily allowance of 600
grams. There had been
"some examples of malnutrition and a deterioration of health." He said
the three
main factors in agriculture were "seed, water and fertilizer." He continued that lack of energy meant water
could
not be pumped to fields and that fertilizer could not be manufactured. Hence lack of power was at the root of the
food
shortages.
2.5.3 We discussed the
reasons why
NGOs and the provision of humanitarian aid are hampered by problems of
access,
distribution and transparency. He agreed that about 20% of the country
remains prohibited
to foreigners: "we cannot budge here. We learnt from Iraq that you will
conduct
espionage." He said that the DPRK government could look after the
people in the
prohibited areas. As for the remaining 80% of the territory he said
there are now 50
monitoring teams (some we discovered are individuals not teams) in the
country. 19 of
these are from the World Food Programme (WFP), 11 from the
International Red Cross (IRC)
and 10 NGOs. In our later discussions with World Vision (who have a
virus free potato seed
project operating in most of the country) and a number of other
agencies we satisfied
ourselves that access and transparency are much improved over the past
two and a half
years. UNWFP told us that "We have come to the conclusion that food
deprivation is
not being targeted" by the regime as a political weapon.
2.5.4 Mr.Jong stressed
that while
emergency aid was vital, what the DPRK really wanted was development
aid. He concluded that "Men are most
grateful to
those who give at the times of their greatest need."
2.5.5 Later in the day we
held talks
with Mr.Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme
People's Assembly, the
most senior political figure we met during our visit. He ranks number
two or three in the
country's political hierarchy.
We
were
told to expect a brief meeting of ten minutes but in the event we spent
one hour and 40
minutes with him.
Mr.Kim
reiterated his belief that the nuclear issue could be resolved
peacefully; was keen to see
bi-lateral relations strengthened; did not, at this juncture, believe
that there was a
specific mediating role that might be performed by the United Kingdom
and told us that
behind the scenes US-DPRK “backstairs talks” were happening in New York. He remarked on the importance of working for
the
goal of co-existence within a re-united Korea.
During
this
meeting CC conveyed a private letter to Mr.Kim.
2.5.6 Mr.Kim welcomed the
news
communicated to him by CC that it was the delegation's intention to
establish an
All-Party Parliamentary British-North Korea group and believed that
this would be a
suitable vehicle for continuing dialogue. Mr.Kim accepted a copy of the
Bible and
specifically asked that “Christians in the West be asked to pray for
the people of
Korea.”His final message was to emhasise that the people do not hate
the Americans;
and that “change can take place more quickly than we might have though
possible.” This was repeated by a senior official as we left the city's
railway
station on the following morning.
2.5.7 CC subsequently
went for a
2-hour walk around Pyongyang, without any restrictions or “minder.”
Free to walk
wherever she chose, she was encouraged by this freedom, very different
from the situation
experienced in some other Communist countries. Also encouraging was the
demeanor of the
people: friendly, smiling and, in several places enjoying dancing in
the open air in
situations which could not have been contrived as “showcase” events.
There were
shops, which, although not comparable to western stores in choice and
abundance, had more
supplies than non-party shops in the former Soviet Union. We recognise
that Pyongyang is
not typical of the whole of the DPRK but it compares favourably in
atmosphere with capital
cities such as Moscow, Warsaw or Bucharest in the days of the “Iron
Curtain.”
2.5.8 The day concluded
with a dinner
and discussion hosted at the British Embassy (during which the DPRK
delegates responded to
the points in the private communiqué delivered to Mr.Kim Yong
Nam). They reminded us of
the Korean proverb that “where there is blossom it is because there is
no wind.”
2.5.9 By and large, the
DPRK
authorities accommodated the itinerary we had requested while in
London, although they
were not able to make significant additions at the last minute.
2.5.10 The delegation was
free to use
video and still cameras throughout the trip (except at Kim Il Sung's
mausoleum).
2.5.11 Although the
delegation
received several specific requests for help, officials were reluctant
to give their
contact details, making it difficult to follow up the requests.
2.6 Thursday September 18th
2.6.1 The delegation left
Pyongyang
railway station and traveled throughout the day and overnight by train
through North Korea
to the Chinese capital of Beijing. The countryside was poor but
cultivated. Tractors and
oxen worked the fields. Hay making and harvesting were underway and
people were going
about everyday tasks. Although the country is totally State-controlled
we were struck that
it did not “feel” suffocated or oppressed by fear in the manner of the
former
USSR. This is not to down-play or deny the use of cruelty and inhumane
treatment of
prisoners and dissidents.
2.7 Friday September, 19th
2.7.1 In Beijing the
delegation met
the British Ambassador, Sir Christopher Hum; Khalid Malik, the UN
Resident Co-coordinator
in China; Colin Mitchell, the UNHCR Regional Representative for China
and Mongolia;
Douglas Broderick of the United Nations World Food Programme; and
Macleod Nyirongo of the
United Nations Development Programme.
2.7.2 We had asked the
Ambassador to
arrange a meeting for us with the Chinese Foreign Affairs Department.
He had been unable
to do this. We gave him a copy of the list of North and South Korean
detainees prepared
for us by Jubilee America and had a long discussion about their plight.
We pointed out
that UNHCR had told us that 200-300 North Koreans are still being
repatriated forcibly
each week without status or determination. We said that the punishments
are most extreme
for those who have left the country more than once; that they are
always harsher if the
individual is connected to a religious organization; and that they face
execution if it is
known that they had tried to leave China. We cited evidence that 26
refugees are currently
detained at one check-point in Mongolia facing a very uncertain outcome.
2.7.3 The British
ambassador said that
his role is simply to raise cases involving UK nationals or where
Chinese policy,
involving human rights violations or religious liberties issues
directly impinged on
Chinese nationals. We pointed out that China was failing to honour
international
agreements about the treatment of refugees to which they and we are
signatories.
2.7.4 We asked for the
name of the
appropriate person in the Department of Foreign Affairs for us to
contact. Sir Christopher
referred us to Mrs.Fu Ying, Director General of their Asia Department.
Before leaving
Beijing we delivered a letter of protest (Appendix E) including the
list of detained North
and South Koreans (Appendix F).
2.7.5 During our meetings
with the UN
agencies we were reminded that in the 1960s the North Korean economy
was twice as viable
as that of the South; that “a developed country has become a
non-developed
country”; that since the departure of MSF, health needs had become
desperate -
“an unlimited need”; that following food shortages and famine “there
are
not many elderly people left in the DPRK”; that in the north east, on
the border with
China, orphaned children whose parents had died during the famine were
living on the
streets: “street swallows” as young as 7; that the DPRK's failing
infrastructure means that, for instance, 60-70% of electricity
transmission “is lost
down the grid” and that, in their view, China's pressure on the DPRK
meant that
“we are no longer heading towards Armageddon” but also that “the US has
no
real interest in resolving this matter.”
(Our
complete itinerary of our visit appears at Appendix G).
3.0 Recommendations
These fall into three
categories:
Security; Political; and Economic.
3.1. Security
- It is not
unimaginable that the DPRK may feel trapped by the failure to resolve
the nuclear
confrontation and so test a nuclear weapon. This would trigger
disastrous consequences,
even the possibility of a nuclear strike by the US and its allies. We
recommend that the
two conditions for denuclearisation, i.e. a commitment to no first
strike by either side
and a pledge of peaceful co-existence should be offered by the US to
the DPRK. This does
not require bilateral talks. It would soon become evident whether the
DPRK's promised
response of denuclearisation is a mirage but nothing would have been
lost by such a move.
- We believe a
peaceful
outcome is indeed possible; that the DPRK is exhausted and weakened and
does not seem to
pose any real military threat (and is an unwelcome distraction at a
time of confrontation
with radical Islamic terrorist organizations).
- The DPRK seems
genuinely afraid that they will be attacked and needs to be offered
some “face
saving” formula to permit a lowering of the temperature.
- Private
informal
“backstairs” talks between the US and the DPRK should continue and be
encouraged
but not replace the multilateral talks. The outcome of those talks
might usefully be
guaranteed by the EU or UN.
- Until last
October
the US were able to enter the DPRK to search for bodies of servicemen
missing in action.
We would like to see such arrangements recommenced and informal
reciprocal meetings of
army officers from both sides.
- The DPRK said
that
they were purposefully misquoted by Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly in October
2002 in saying that they had a nuclear device. They claim they actually
said they had
“a more powerful weapon than a nuclear bomb, namely single hearted
unity of the
nation.” Their hint is that they do not actually have such weapons but
the evidence
is mixed and we believe that as a condition of “peaceful co-existence"
it would
be imperative for the resumption of International Atomic Energy Agency
inspections.
3.2. Political
- We recommend
the
encouragement of Helsinki-style initiatives ofmutual engagement between
the DPRK and the
West/South Korea.
- There is nothing
to
fear from a step-by-step approach towards two systems in one country
and we should offer
models and evidence (e.g. Hong Kong/China and models for Joint
Assemblies such as the
Council of Europe).
- The German
experience
of re-unification should inspire confidence in such a process taking
place in Korea.
- There should be
an
end to isolationism and a normalization of diplomatic relations. In the
worst days of the
Soviet Union there was always a US Embassy in Moscow. The US experience
in China and
Vietnam in using trade as a stimulus for reform would also be pertinent.
- The US and UK
should
encourage more parliamentarians and Members of Congress to travel to
the DPRK and to
engage them in dialogue.
- President
Clinton
predicted the implosion of the DPRK. This was a miscalculation but a
policy of
asphyxiation could also be a dangerous miscalculation.
- The DPRK needs
to
understand that pluralism, the creation of genuine opposition parties,
free speech, open
dialogue on human rights, religious and political liberties, will all
have to be addressed
before South Korea allows a permanent deepening of relationships
- We recommend
that
pressure continue to be asserted in requesting the admission of an
independent assessment
team to visit the prisons. Such a team might include doctors, lawyers
and engineers and
might seek EU resources to allow for the rebuilding of the prisons.
- China's role in
repatriating a significant number of DPRK refugees should be challenged
by the
international community. As most leave for economic reasons, aid
programmes need to be
re-established in the northern areas most affected by hunger. When
leaving for reasons of
persecution an orderly passage to South Korea should be guaranteed by
the international
community.
3.3 Economic
- The economic
fortunes
of the DPRK are dependent on progress being made on security and
political concerns.
- Projects such
as the
railway linking the north and south should be expedited and passenger
transportation (as
well as cargo) be encouraged.
- Investors and
NGOs
are wary of an uncertain future: many more would come if the key
questions were resolved.
- Internet and
mobile
phone networks should be opened up - allowing communications with free
societies.
- The British
Council
should open and office in Pyongyang; meet the huge demand for English
as a Foreign
Language; and provide the university with more English publications.
- Requested
exchanges of students, especially students in business studies, should
be expedited.
- We share the
DPRK
view that emergency aid should be complemented by development aid. We
recommend that a
priority should be small micro projects (such as the water irrigation
and purification
project established by the Irish aid agency, Concern, at Anju, that we
mention at Page 9
of our report).
4.0
Conclusions
4.1 As they plunge into a
deepening
crisis, the DPRK realises that it is at a critical crossroads. It is
our firm conclusion
that they are seeking a way forward. When
they say that they are seeking a peaceable outcome they should be taken
at their word and
the sincerity of their claim tested through engagement.
4.2 The history of the
DPRK suggests
that mere threats will be counter-productive, inducing paranoia,
isolationism, and the
destabilization of the region. Recent US policy has convinced the
regime that the status
quo is not an option. The DPRK now needs a face-saving exit strategy.
Progress on these
issues would further enable progress on the human rights issues that
motivated our visit.
A divided Korea is provoking regional instability. A united Korea could
be a force for
stability in the region and be a strong counterweightto other
regional players.
4.3 In the short-term we are deeply concerned about the
plight of
repatriated refugees and about the conditions in the prisons. The international community should not await
the
resolution of strategic issues before pursuing these questions with the
DPRK. But we are convinced that engagement
on all fronts
represents the best way forward. The delegation will form an All-Party
Parliamentary
British-North Korean group to facilitate our own continued engagement
and we hope that the
Foreign Office will provide resources to enable its work to prosper.
David Alton,
Caroline Cox
September 25th,
2003.
jsmddh.com
